

which experts still very seriously disagree. Accordingly, it would seem to need considerably more study and discussion before being put into effect, which in turn suggests that it should be made the subject of a careful and level-headed congressional investigation, leaving no essential details in the dark as far as the general public is concerned.

Clarification Needed

The pace of political developments in Europe, bringing to the fore problems demanding expeditious decisions, makes it imperative for the United States not only to clarify its own position vis-a-vis Britain and the Soviet Union, but also to find out precisely where the Churchill and Stalin governments stand. Presumably this will be the main purpose of the visit to be made soon to London by Undersecretary of State Stettinius and a staff of American diplomatic experts.

From the standpoint of principle, the framework of Allied postwar cooperation has already been established by such documents as the Atlantic Charter and the declarations of Moscow, Tehran and Cairo. But agreement upon a principle does not necessarily lead to agreement upon the way in which the principle is to be put into practice. In the strictly military sphere, there seems to be no reason for misgiving on this score, because the joint general commitments of Britain, Russia and the United States apparently are being carried out in specific and concrete instances pretty much according to the original letter and spirit without any important hitch.

In the political sphere, however, there are indications that the same degree of smoothness is lacking and that differences as to detail and method will have to be ironed out if tomorrow's world is going to be reordered along the lines formally proclaimed by the United Nations.

As far as Finland is concerned, for instance, Britain, which is at war with the Finns, appears to be in full agreement with the preliminary peace terms offered by Russia, but the United States, which is at peace with the Finns, has committed itself only to the extent of urging that Helsinki continue conversations with Moscow. Similarly, although Prime Minister Churchill has sided with the Stalin government in approving the Curzon Line formula as the basis for a settlement of the Polish border question, no clear-cut American stand has been taken beyond Secretary Hull's offer to help mediate the matter. Nor is it clear just what our position is as regards Italy and Yugoslavia.

These are but a few of the problems calling for specific agreements within the broad framework of postwar principles enunciated by the Allies. Less immediate but perhaps even more formidable are the problems of what is to be done with Germany, how France is to be reconstituted, and how the governments in exile are to be regarded when the occupied countries are liberated, one by one, from the Nazis. Of course, nothing must be allowed to interfere with the task of winning the war as quickly as possible, but at the same time it must be recognized that if chaos is to be avoided in Europe, a program must be worked out now to meet the political situation that will obtain when the shooting stops and which exists, indeed, even while the shooting goes on.

In many ways, because they are bound together by treaty and because both are geographically close to the problems, Britain and Russia seem to be following a firmer and better defined course than the United States, even though they do not always see eye to eye and are cloudy themselves in respect to many issues. Accordingly, there is a real and pressing need for a fresh exchange of views, both to make our attitude clear to the British and Russians and to make theirs clear to us.

Our Atlantic Victory

It has been clear for some time that Hitler has lost the battle of the Atlantic. If proof of this were necessary, the story of our lease-lend shipments to Russia would be sufficient, wholly apart from official British-American figures on the decimation of Germany's once-deadly U-boat fleet. In 1942, out of every 100 vessels carrying vital war cargoes from Britain and the United States to the Soviet Union, 12 were sent to the bottom by Nazi bombers, surface raiders and submarines. In 1943, only one out of every 100 was thus destroyed.

These figures, just revealed by the Foreign Economic Administration, are, in their own way, as striking a measure of the decline of German power as anything yet reported from any battle front. For they constitute conclusive evidence of Hitler's failure—after an all-out effort on his part—to sever the ocean supply lines of the United Nations. This failure, this defeat, may safely be regarded as one of the most significant and decisive developments in the war, for it was upon winning the Atlantic and thus isolating the Nazis from the other that the Allies had pinned their plans for victory. They had hoped—and for a time they seemed almost to be realizing the hope—to cut off England from the United States and Russia from both, and so to finish us off one by one.

Exactly how close they came to achieving this, if it will ever be known, will probably not be known until after the war. As far as Russia is concerned, however, there is good reason to believe that they came fairly close to it when they were sinking more than 10 per cent

of our Russian-bound ships. No supply line was more dangerous than the one across the North Atlantic to Murmansk and Archangel. For a time, with U-boats, surface raiders and bombers based in Northern Norway and Finland, the Nazis made this sea lane a lane of death and destruction. But Allied heroism, the development of the alternate trans-Atlantic route into the Soviet Union, and the perfection of New British-American antisubmarine techniques finally won out, so that in 1943 what was once a grave menace was at last virtually eliminated. In the long view of history, it may well be established that no United Nations' victory was greater than this or did more to shatter Hitler's dreams of world conquest.

Stalemate in Italy

Daily fluctuations in the Italian struggle going on at the Anzio beachhead should not make us lose sight of the larger strategic picture in Italy. And there is no use blinking the fact that the campaign there continues to be one of stalemate, with the initiative in German hands. The strategic key to the over-all situation is still the transpeninsula front, some 60 miles south of our beachhead below Rome. On that mountainous line, stretching across the narrowest section of the Italian peninsula, the strongly-intrenched Germans have thus far foiled every Allied effort to break through. But it was upon an imminent breakthrough at Cassino that the Allied high command predicated its "leap-frog" descent upon the stretch of coast which started the Anzio battle.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this bold maneuver was never intended to be the major operation. Absence of port facilities rendered it logistically impossible to make it the base for a large mechanized army. The idea was to threaten the German coastal line of communications and compel a weakening of their Cassino front at the precise moment when a decisive stroke was delivered there by the main Allied army. Those two ground moves were synchronized with an intensive aerial offensive at German communications all the way up the Italian peninsula to the Alpine passes, designed to paralyze German reinforcements and supplies to the south.

Strategically the plan was sound, and the indications are that it came very near succeeding. But the German high command took an even bolder gamble. It refused to weaken the Cassino front, and managed to bring up troops and equipment enough to pin our Anzio forces to a narrow beachhead, within range of their artillery emplaced on dominating hills. From those vantage points the Germans have launched a series of attacks which, though they have failed to drive us into the sea, have kept us strictly on the defensive, with heavy losses not only in shipping and landing craft. This unfavorable situation has now lasted for six weeks, while the Cassino front continued deadlocked. The stalemate thus persists.

One of our chief handicaps has been bad weather. Perhaps when the skies clear in the normally fair Italian spring, this will make a decisive difference. If not, large reinforcements for our armies in Italy may be necessary to gain a local decision. But this might entail unfortunate diversions of troops and, even more, of shipping and landing craft, from the impending "second front" in Western Europe. Meanwhile Germany appears to be reaping political and psychological gains from the transaction which probably outweigh the incidental losses in men and materiel.

The Italian Fleet

There is probably more than meets the eye in the seemingly casual announcement by the President that there is to be a three-way division of the Italian fleet, with Britain, Russia and the United States receiving approximately equal shares.

It is obvious that the President's announcement was received with surprise in London, and in stories emanating from the British capital there has been some speculation as to possible adverse effects of the disclosure. For one thing, it is pointed out that most of the serviceable units of the Italian fleet that fell into Allied hands are now operating in the Mediterranean. A number are manned by Italian crews and some have Italian officers under British supervision. They have been doing effective convoy and patrol work, enabling the British to release some of their own ships for other duties. It seems not improbable, however, that the President's announcement, coming at this time, will have an adverse effect on their morale, particularly the suggestion that some of the units will be turned over to Russia. Some question also has been raised as to the reaction of the French, the Yugoslavs and the Greeks, all of whom have lost heavily in the Mediterranean and who are reported to have been eyeing the Italian fleet as a possible source of compensation.

At this time, however, there seems more reason to be concerned with the use to which the Italian warships will be put than with the reactions of those who may be disappointed by the announcement. Mr. Roosevelt said that it is the intention to run everything that floats for the benefit of the war. Just how the Italian ships or their equivalent, in Russian hands, will be fitted into this declaration is not readily apparent to the layman, but it does follow from this that it cannot or will not be done.

War May Provide Lesson for Axis

By W. H. Harrison.

It is one thing to inflict a military defeat upon an enemy and quite another thing to make him change his mind—to convince him that all his old beliefs are wrong, to convert him to a new political philosophy, to transform his whole pattern of intellectual behavior. Sooner or later, Germany and Japan are going to be forced to lay down their arms, but in doing that they will not automatically be casting off the type of thinking that has set them apart from the rest of the world as states uniquely fond of blood and iron and queerly disposed to regard themselves as communities of supermen.

Some time ago, in recognition of this phase of the coming peace problem, Vice President Wallace declared that the United Nations would have to subject Germany and Japan to a program of "psychological disarmament" designed to get the poison out of their educational systems and to teach them that chronic pugnacity, the love of might for might's sake and the master-race complex do not pay. Similarly, at a recent conference of the American Association of School Administrators, Dr. Alexander J. Stoddard of Philadelphia called for the strictest international control over all education in both countries, asserting that every Axis pedagogy should be removed and "forever barred from teaching again" and that the schools themselves should be closed, if necessary, until trustworthy new teachers can be found. The main objective, in his opinion, is to see to it that German and Japanese children do not have their minds twisted once more as in the years before and during the present war.

What Mr. Wallace and Dr. Stoddard propose, however, is much more easily said than done. For although great numbers of Germans and Japanese have been unaffected by it directly, the poison runs very deep among the most literate and influential groups in both countries. Moreover, it is not something that began flowing only with the advent of Hitler and the rise of the Tokyo warlords. In the case of Japan, the mind-twisting had its inception centuries ago, growing out of religious concepts establishing the Land of the Rising Sun as a land of gods and demigods destined to rule the earth. In the case of Germany, the basic Nazi viewpoints were articulated generations before the coming of the Fuehrer by philosophers of great but perverted genius—the German nihilists who rebelled against Christian principles, scoffed at abstract standards of justice and apotheosized naked power as the sole measure of what is good or right.

As one who is well acquainted with this subject, C. J. Hambro, head of the last Norwegian Parliament and former president of the League of Nations Assembly, has written that German thought and German action since 1870 have been largely motivated by "the Fichte-Hegel-Nietzsche concept of the German mission, of a state with a divine right to demand everything from individuals, of the blond German superman who has been called upon to rule the world." Decades before the ascendancy of Hitler this concept was being hammered into young, impressionable heads by thousands of schoolmasters through-out Germany; the idea, the evil seed, thus already was sown by the time the Nazis came along. They had merely to cultivate it to make it blossom gruesomely into aggression and war.

Fichte, for instance, died in 1814, but long before then he had precursed the Fuehrer, "Promise peace," he said, "that thou mayest begin war with advantage." The people metaphysically predestined have the moral right to fulfill their destiny by means of cunning and force. . . . Between states there is neither law nor right unless it be the right of the strongest." And Nietzsche, who thought of Christianity as something "seductive, charming, deluding and corrupting" and who preached a way of life beyond good or evil, left behind him this counsel for Hitler: "Ye have heard men say, 'Blessed be the peacemakers'; but I say unto you: Blessed are the war-makers, for they shall be called, if not the children of Jahwe, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahwe."

Later, echoing his masters, Bernhardi wrote: "War is a biological necessity . . . a moral obligation . . . an indispensable factor in civilization. . . . 'World power or downfall' will be our rallying cry. . . . We Germans have a duty to perform. . . . We like the Japanese, can only fulfill it by the sword." And from other sources, before and since Hitler's rise to power, the youth of Germany has been indoctrinated with such thoughts as this: "People must learn to realize that he who cannot be a German is a pariah." And this: "Must civilization build its temples upon mountains of dead, oceans of tears, the death rattle of the dying? Yes, it must! If a people has the right to domination, its power of conquest constitutes the highest law." And so on, ad nauseam.

Blood-and-iron thinking of much the same sort—but without the touch of warped genius characterizing such German philosophy as that of Nietzsche—has likewise exercised a profound influence in Japan, and it has done so for a much longer time than in Germany, so that to re-educate the Nipponese, to get the poison out of their system, will probably be even more difficult than in the case of the Germans. Americans may find it hard to imagine the degree to which both countries have been susceptible to the doctrine of violence, but there are few students of the subject who are not agreed that the two have made that doctrine a key part of their historic national policies. This does not mean that all the Germans and all the Nipponese are congenital fire-eaters, but it does mean that they have seemed peculiarly prone, by and large, to follow those who glorify the uses of the sword and preach mystically of predestined racial rights to dominate the world.

When peace comes, therefore, the question will still remain whether the beaten enemy has been mentally disarmed as well as disarmed physically. Certainly an effort will have to be made to this end, but it is doubtful, as some American educators have pointed out, that a control program like that suggested by Dr. Stoddard could be made to work even if it were clearly desirable. For wholly apart from the fact that nothing could more effectively embitter a nation than a severe outside supervision of its schools, the mere mechanics required to operate such a plan would be a problem of the first order. Besides,

Time for an Upward Look

By the Rev. L. Ralph Tabor, D. D.,

Pastor of Luther Place Memorial Church.

A number of years ago statisticians estimated that there were approximately 600,000,000 Christians on this planet. Immediately a popular journalist remarked caustically that if indeed this were so he wondered where in the world they lived. Perhaps the fact that relatively few of the many millions frequently look upward toward their God in lengthened periods of adoration and worship accounts, at least in part, for this critic's difficulty.

When we are so preoccupied with the pursuit of daily labor, money and pleasure that we give, perhaps as a maximum, five minutes of our waking hours each day to prayer and thoughts of God, it is no wonder, as a modern writer suggests, that business seems two hundred times more real than God. The right use of the Lentenide, indeed, can make vital and relevant the sense of God's presence.

Christendom looks many ways during Lent: backward, to contemplate the events of the Passion of Jesus Christ; inward, to stir the conscience with an awareness of personal failings; around, to acknowledge the challenge of tasks yet to come; upward, to shake the ancient urge toward worship and knowing that God ever is revealing His presence. Yes, Christendom looks upward, for the remembered Christ "has pressed on before our race"; He is found in the upward look. As in the midst of back-breaking physical labor an upward look brings relief and fresh vigor, so the crowded life of bewildered humanity finds a spiritual lift in the upward look of Lentenide.

The gift of the upward look is described many times in the Holy Scriptures. There was that disheartened servant of the prophet, ready only for utter defeat, until an upward look brought him the knowledge that more real than the mountains which hemmed him in his valley of despondency were the hosts of the Lord. There was a

Fifty Years Ago

Fifty years ago a new Commissioner for the District was confirmed by the Senate, after having been appointed by the President, just as he left for a trip. As printed in The Star of March 5, 1894: "The nomination of Colonel George Truesdell to be Commissioner of the District was confirmed by the Senate this afternoon. Colonel Truesdell will enter upon his duties as soon as he can qualify." The confirmation was a foregone conclusion, as the colonel's background and experience were ideal for the position. He succeeded Myron M. Parker.

President Cleveland was back in town after a cruise down the Chesapeake Bay to North Carolina waters. Said The Star of March 5, 1894: "The presidential" gunning party returned to the city at 1:35 this afternoon. The lighthouse tender Violet, which has of late blossomed into such distinction as an administration favorite, was sighted off Indian Head at 11 o'clock this forenoon. The news that it was passing the proving grounds was electrically heralded to the world." The first part of the trip had been rough, but most of it was in mild weather, weather too mild, it was said, for one purpose of the trip, hunting wild ducks. Other game, principally snipe, were obtained. Highly dubious praise was given to the President's prowess. One observer said that he "about well for a man who had had no more experience than he had," while another said diplomatically that the President was "a fine shot if the game would only stand still long enough."

"Will Man Ever Fly?" inquired The Star of March 3, 1894. An unidentified scientist, in answer to a Star writer who put that question, said: "I myself am disposed to answer in the affirmative. Man is a wonderful animal. Until he has accomplished this ambition he will never rest content." There is no doubt in the minds of advanced thinkers on this subject that man must imitate the birds. He will never get very far toward the solution of the problem by the use of balloons. It is evident that man must imitate the large soaring birds, which have moderate strength in proportion to their size." The notion of flying with an engine does not seem to have occurred to this particular scientist, and he suggested a top speed for flying man of 30 miles per hour.

The Star of March 3, 1894, carried a long account of the preparations for the blood-and-iron thinking of much the same sort—but without the touch of warped genius characterizing such German philosophy as that of Nietzsche—has likewise exercised a profound influence in Japan, and it has done so for a much longer time than in Germany, so that to re-educate the Nipponese, to get the poison out of their system, will probably be even more difficult than in the case of the Germans. Americans may find it hard to imagine the degree to which both countries have been susceptible to the doctrine of violence, but there are few students of the subject who are not agreed that the two have made that doctrine a key part of their historic national policies. This does not mean that all the Germans and all the Nipponese are congenital fire-eaters, but it does mean that they have seemed peculiarly prone, by and large, to follow those who glorify the uses of the sword and preach mystically of predestined racial rights to dominate the world.

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The "lost" statue of James Monroe at Ash Lawn, Va., where he spent 26 years of his life. Unveiled April 28, 1891, the 173d anniversary of his birth, it is the first statue of Monroe Doctrine, fifth President, a soldier wounded at the Battle of Trenton, four times a foreign Minister of the United States, to be erected in his native State, and the largest figure of any statue in the State.

The Titanic effigy is 11 feet high, carved from a solid block of marble more than 45 years ago for Venezuela. The figure weighs three tons and was cut by Attilio Piccirilli, New York sculptor, on order of President Crespo of Venezuela, following a controversy between England and the Latin American republic, in which President Cleveland intervened under the Monroe Doctrine. President Crespo planned to place the statue in front of the Capitol at Caracas, but before it could be shipped a revolution resulted in the overthrow of the government and Crespo died in jail.

One of the most "human" and "whole-some" of George Washington's preserved writings is a letter of advice to his niece, Harriet Washington, dated Philadelphia, October 30, 1791. Some 12 years ago, at the time of the Washington Bicentennial Celebration, Senator Simeon D. Peas, vice president of the commission for the celebration, who for many years had been a close student of the writings of the first President, called attention to this letter. He said: "I wish that every young woman in our fair land would read it. It is full of excellent advice, and has a present-day appeal"—perhaps more significant today than then.

The first submarine was used in the American Revolution. It figured in an attempt to blow up Admiral Howe's flagship, the Eagle, anchored off the shore of Governors Island. A young Connecticut mechanic, David Bushnell, had invented what he called a "marine turtle." It was claimed that a daring man could move underwater, fasten the